How Sudan could become an Iran-UAE proxy war

Iran’s efforts to establish a foothold in Sudan threatens its fragile ties with the UAE, which has its own interests in the war-torn country.

Before international attention turned to Iran’s role in strikes against US troops in the Middle East, Tehran had quietly been seeking to expand its influence in the Red Sea region, with Sudan emerging as a significant target and reports in late January alleging that Iran had delivered drones to the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF).

Iranian Foreign Minister Hossein Amir-Abdollahian hosted his Sudanese counterpart, Ali Al-Sadiq Ali, in the capital Tehran on Monday. It was the first visit by a senior Sudanese official since the two countries resumed their diplomatic ties in October as Khartoum grapples with a split in government between Sudan Transitional Sovereignty Council leader Abdel Fattah al-Burhan and his rival, Mohamed Hamdan Dagalo Hemedti.

The Iranians, according to three Western officials cited by Bloomberg, sent the Sudanese military multiple shipments of the Mohajer-6, a single-engine unmanned aircraft that carries precision-guided munitions and is manufactured in Iran by Qods Aviation Industries.

The reported deliveries mark the involvement of another regional actor in Sudan’s brutal civil war, with Egypt and Saudi Arabia already backing the SAF. Meanwhile, the United Arab Emirates has faced increasing accusations of backing the SAF’s rival, the paramilitary Rapid Support Forces (RSF), exacerbating fears that Sudan may evolve into a proxy war between the UAE and Iran.

The Sudanese conflict has reached a critical point, with more than 12,000 people killed and more than 5.1 million displaced since the war between the RSF and SAF erupted in April 2023.

The RSF, having split from the SAF, now controls significant areas of Sudan, including parts of Khartoum, the capital, and the country’s second-largest city, Wad Madani. The RSF also dominates much of the Darfur region.

Efforts to mediate the war have faltered. In January, Sudan suspended its membership in the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD), an East African regional bloc, which has attempted to broker talks between the Sudanese rivals. Khartoum accused the IGAD of violating its sovereignty by inviting RSF leader Mohamed Hamdan “Hemedti” Dagalo to talks it had scheduled to mediate in Djibouti last December. The discussions were ultimately postponed, due to “technical reasons,” according to Djibouti’s Foreign Ministry. The proposed talks came after diplomatic measures, including meetings in Jeddah, failed to end the conflict.

Iran’s involvement

Iran, signaling its involvement in the Sudanese war, rekindled diplomatic relations with Khartoum as the war raged, resuming full ties in October after a seven-year hiatus. This renewed connection gathered pace after Iranian Foreign Minister Hossein Amir-Abdollahian and his Sudanese counterpart, Ali al-Sadiq, met in the Azerbaijani capital of Baku in July 2023. Iran seems to be focusing on Sudan per its strategy to counter its isolation amid US and Western sanctions. Central to this vision is building alliances with nations in the Global South, especially in Africa.

Iranian-Sudanese relations took a negative turn in 2016, when Sudan, under President Omar al-Bashir, cut ties with Tehran. The decision aligned Sudan with the Gulf states’ stance against Iran after Iranian protesters stormed the Saudi Embassy that year. In addition, Sudan under Bashir joined the Saudi-led coalition in Yemen against the Iran-backed Houthis.

Bashir’s moves came as a strategic blow for Iran, considering the positive ties it had had with Khartoum since the late 1980s. Bashir’s government had even endorsed Iran’s nuclear program, despite regional and Western concerns over Tehran’s nuclear ambitions.

While Iran has increasingly set its sights on Africa, strengthening ties with Sudan also offers access to the Red Sea, a vital transit corridor through which a significant portion of global trade passes. The Red Sea’s importance has recently been highlighted by Houthi attacks there on shipping — strikes the rebels claim are in solidarity with Palestinians in Gaza amid the Hamas-Israel war — and the US-led response to try to stop them.

A potential agreement with Sudan would enable Iran to refuel its naval vessels in the Red Sea and expand its maritime presence there, highlighting its long-term regional ambitions. Such an agreement could give Iran access to Port Sudan, where the SAF has established its de facto headquarters.

The ongoing conflict in Sudan, fueled by the rivalry between the SAF and RSF, fosters an environment that facilitates Iran’s engagement with the SAF, which seeks new allies. Iranian drones, which the US accuses Tehran of supplying to Russia in its war in Ukraine, are expected to play a significant role in aiding the SAF against the RSF.

Interestingly, Hemedti has accused the SAF of harboring Islamists linked to the Bashir regime, or the Kizan group. This might see Iran forming alliances with Islamist factions aligned with the SAF, like the Kizan, which has historical ties with Iran, and other groups near the Red Sea, such as the Beja tribe.

More broadly, Iran may hope to extend its influence over the SAF and bring it under its sway. Currently, the SAF, with its war against the RSF, looks to bolster its external relationships, and Iran, by providing support, could concurrently secure its own ambitions in the Red Sea.

The UAE’s Red Sea ambitions

The Red Sea becoming a strategic focal point has turned more eyes toward the UAE’s role in that region. The UAE has in the past played a key role in Sudan, often in coordination with Saudi Arabia. Following the 2019 revolution that toppled Bashir, the UAE and Saudi Arabia both pledged to provide Sudan’s Transitional Military Council with $3 billion of assistance.

With the RSF being a pivotal actor in the Transitional Military Council, Abu Dhabi deepened its ties with the group, in an apparent split from Saudi Arabia. Notably, the RSF has been involved in securing gold mines, which the UAE has invested in, and Abu Dhabi has also made agricultural investments in Sudan.

With indications that the RSF is the UAE’s ally on the ground, the Emirates’ role came under further scrutiny after a recent UN report highlighted “credible evidence” of Abu Dhabi supporting the group with supplies “several times per week” from neighboring Chad, allegations that the Emirati government has denied. Such involvement has attracted attention internationally as well as in Sudan.

Yasser al-Atta, the SAF’s assistant commander in chief, criticized the UAE in a speech in November, accusing it of behaving like a “mafia state.” In December, the Sudanese government ordered the expulsion of several Emirati diplomats, blaming Abu Dhabi for exacerbating the internal conflict.

In the Red Sea region, Abu Dhabi’s influence extends beyond its political maneuvers and current investments in Sudan. As a leading port developer in the Horn of Africa, the UAE has also invested heavily in ports in Djibouti, Eritrea and Somaliland, bolstering its commercial network in the area.

Just prior to the onset of the Sudanese civil war, Abu Dhabi in December 2022 signed a $6 billion deal with Sudan’s provisional government to develop a port and economic zone linked to Port Sudan. The RSF’s expanding control in Sudan not only aids the UAE in countering Islamist forces aligned with the Sudanese army, but could ultimately serve Abu Dhabi’s ambitions of influence in the strategic Red Sea region off Sudan.

A multipolar war

The conflicting goals of Iran and the UAE in accessing the Red Sea through ties with Sudan could exacerbate tensions in their relationship that they had otherwise been trying to mend. Tehran and Abu Dhabi have been navigating disagreements over the Greater Tunb, Lesser Tunb, and Abu Musa islands in the Strait of Hormuz while also easing bilateral trade restrictions.

Amid tensions across the Middle East, Abu Dhabi has been trying to urge deescalation, while also insisting on maintaining ties with Israel. Sudan’s strategic importance in the Red Sea, however, might hinder any progress in a rapprochement between the UAE and Iran, adding a fresh layer of complexity to their relations.

Saudi Arabia, supporting the SAF, views Sudan as a gateway to Africa. East Africa serves as a critical juncture connecting the Arabian Peninsula with the rest of the African continent. While Saudi’ Arabia’s engagement in Sudan is evidently less aggressive than that of the UAE, favoring a diplomatic route, such as hosting talks, its approach also diverges from Iran’s interests. This difference could lead to conflicts over strategies for supporting or managing the SAF’s role in any postconflict scenario in Sudan.

The situation in Sudan adds a new source of tension to the relationship between Iran and the UAE, and it may also pose challenges to the wider efforts at a rapprochement between Tehran and the Gulf states, which follows on the China-brokered normalization of ties between Iran and Saudi Arabia in March 2023. As the war rages on, it may further escalate Abu Dhabi and Iran’s competition, though they may eventually look to manage their differences.

For now, the increasingly multipolar and internationalized nature of the Sudanese war, evolving into a more apparent proxy war driven byIran and the UAE’s conflicting ambitions, could spell further turmoil in the country and dim hopes for a smooth resolution of the violence.

This article was originally published in Al-Monitor: https://www.al-monitor.com/originals/2024/02/how-sudan-could-become-iran-uae-proxy-war#ixzz8RWCU52OI